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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Supermarket Sale of Drugs and Medicines Enjoined
In a suit by the State of Minnesota' to restrain a supermarket chain and a
"rack-jobber" 2 from selling patent and proprietary medicines in violation of the
Minnesota Pharmacy Law,3 the state supreme court reversed the trial court's
holding that injunctive relief was not available and granted a new trial. Among
the items involved were Alka-Seltzer, Anacin, Bromo-Seltzer, Bufferin, PeptoBismol, Pinex, and Sal Hepatica. The ilaintiffs alleged that the sale of these items
was widespread throughout the state and that it would have been expensive,
burdensome, and almost impossible to restrain the sale by indi-idual criminal
prosecutions.
It has often been stated that equity will not enforce the criminal law,4 but
equity has nonetheless invaded the field of criminal law when it could do so under
either of two principal exceptions: (1) by use of its power to abate nuisances affecting the public health or welfare, even though a penal remedy is provided; and
(2) where a criminal statute expressly provides for an injunction.0 As to the first
basis, it is dear that the extent of equity's power will depend on the definition of
the word "nuisance." The definition gradually has been expanded from its early
narrow common law meaning to an iUi-defined, broad concept which gives equity
courts a "free pass" to enter the criminal law area whenever any possible danger
to public health or welfare can be found.7 It has been said that "the elasticity
I. State v. Red Owls Stores, Inc., -Minn.-, 92 N.W.2d 103 (1958).
2. A "rack-jobber" is a wholesaler who usually sells on consignment and
often packages the merchandise in bags for display on a peg-board or rack.
3.

MINN.

STAT. ANN.

§151.15 provides:

It shall be unlawful, for any person to compound, dispense, vend, or sell at retail, drugs, medicines, chemicals, or
poisons in any place other than a pharmacy, except as provided in this chapter.
No proprietor of a pharmacy shall permit the compounding or dispensing of prescriptions or the vending or
selling at retail of drugs, medicines, chemicals, or poisons
in his pharmacy except under the personal supervision
of a pharmacist or of an assistant pharmacist in the temporary absence of the pharmacist.
MINN. STAT. ANN. §151.25 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in the
business of selling at wholesale, or his agent, to sell drugs,
medicines, chemicals, or poisons to other than a pharmacy,
except as provided in this chapter.
4. People ex rel. Bennett v. Laman, 277 N.Y. 368, 14 N.E.2d 439 (1938).
5. Meyer v. Seifert, 216 Ark. 293, 225 S.W.2d 4 (1949); In re Debs, 158
U.S. 564 (1895); Cranford v. Tyrrell, 128 N.Y. 341, 28 N.E. 514 (1891); Pompano
Horse Club v. State, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (1927). Also see POMEROY, 4 EQuiTY
JURISPRUDENCE 953 (5th ed. 1941), 'and Caldwell, Injunctions Against Crime, 26
ILL. L. REv. 259 (1931).

6. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Marshall, 100 Miss. 626, 56 So. 792
(1911). People v. Photocolor Corp., 156 Misc. 47, 281 N.Y.Supp. 130 (1935), Is an
example of a case involving statutory injunction ("Blue Sky Laws"). Also see
note, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 118 (1938).
7. MCCLINTOCK ON EQUITY 443 (2d ed. 1948).

RECENT DECISIONS
of the word nuisance permits courts to stretch it to cover almost any situation
which threatens injury to interests of the public. ' 8 Some jurisdictions have
retained the common law requirement of a threat of irreparable harm to the
claimant's property before invoking injunctive relief,9 but many others deny the
necessity of a property interest.10 A justification for the abandonment of the
property interest requirement was advanced in an Illinois case' where it was
said:
Maintenance of the public health, morals, safety and welfare is on a
plane above mere pecuniary damages although not susceptible of
measurement in money, and to say that a court of equity may not enjoin
a public nuisance because property rights are not involved, would be to
say that the state is2 unable to enforce the law or protect its citizens
from public wrongs.1
The effect would then seem to be that the criminality of the act sought to be
enjoined will operate only to increase the difficulty of proving inadequacy of the
remedy at law, which difficulty the complaining party may nonetheless overcome
by a mere preponderance of the evidence, so long as one of the above mentioned
exceptions under which the courts will enter the criminal area is present.
The issues raised in the present case were centered about the trial court's
finding that the criminal prosecution provided for in the statute was exclusive
and its further finding that there had been no showing of a danger to public
health. Underlying the case was the fact that here was involved not an isolated
act or course of action or merely one or a few individuals, but rather a problem,
nationwide in significance, concerning a statewide industry. The issue squarely
presented was whether the sale of proprietary and patent. medicines should be
limited to drugstores or whether they should be permitted to be sold elsewhere:
If the court felt that the sale of these items should be limited to drugstores, then

it could utilize the public nuisance theory as a means of effecting the desired
results. The court did uphold the sales restriction but its reasoning was
inconclusive.
8. Caldwell, Injunctions Against Crime, 26 ILL. L. REV. 259, 268 (1931). Also
see New Orleans v. Liberty Shop, Ltd., 157 La. 26, 101 So. 798 (1924) (enforcement of zoning laws); State v. Knudson, 121 Neb. 270, 236 N.W. 696 (1931) (control of disease among animals]; State ex rel. Indiana State Board of Dental Examiners v. Boston System Dentists, 215 Ind. 485, 19 N.E.2d 949 (1939) (illegal
practice of dentisty); In re Dawkins, 289 N.Y. 553, 43 N.E.2d 530 (1942) (illegal
practice of law); State v. Howard, 214 Iowa 60, 241 N.W. 682 (1932) (illegal
practice of medicine); Funk Jewelry Co. v. State ex rel, Le Prade, 46 Ariz. 348,
50 P.2d 945 (1935) (illegal practice of optometry).
9. State v. Vaughn, 81 Ark. 117, 98 S.W. 685 (1902); People v. Condon, 102
Ill.App. 449 (1902); State v. O'Leary,' 155 Ind. 526, 58 N.E. 703 (1900).
10. Stead v. Fortner, supra note 8; State v. Ellis, 201 Ala. 295, 78 So. 71
(1918).
11. Ibid.
12. For a New York application of this doctrine, see People ex rel. Bennett v. Laman, supranote 4.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
In an effort to show that the remedy at law was not adequate the court
discussed the scope of the defendants' business and their policy of resisting
enforcement of the Pharmacy Law at every opportunity. It stated that this intent
was manifested by the defendants having advised their customers to continue to
display and sell the medicines involved in spite of orders to the contrary by the
inspectors of the state Board of Pharmacy, as well as having agreed to assume the
expenses of litigation if any action were brought against their customers. This
policy of continued and widespread resistance to enforcement was held to be
sufficient evidence of the inadequacy of the remedy at law. The disjenting opinion
did not criticize the majority's holding on this point but could have observed
that the defendants' policy of resistance may merely have been an effort to obtain
adjudication in the courts and did not evidence a wide-spread conspiracy
rendering legal remedies inadequate. Upon examination of the portions of
defendants' testimony quoted in the majority opinion, it appears that they believed
that they could legally sell these items and they intended to do so until the statute
was interpreted. Instead, the dissent concluded that there had been no showing
of inadequacy of the legal remedy because there had been neither prior convictions
nor commencement of legal action. It would seem that a showing of either of
the above factors would be evidence of the inadequacy of the legal remedy, but it
hardly seems that their absence would be conclusive on the issue.
The trial court excluded the state's evidence as to the sale by self-service of
the drugs in the supermarkets on the ground that the manner of sale had no
bearing on the question of injury to public health. The Supreme Court held this
to have been an undue restriction of the proof. The regulations of the state Board
of Pharmacyla prohibited the granting of pharmacy licenses to supermarket-type
stores where drugs were sold in an area not under the supervision of a pharmacist
or where the purchaser was permitted to serve himself. This *as evidence of the
public policy of the state against such sale techniques. Furthermore, examination
of the cautions and warnings of side effects printed on the labels of the medicines
led the court to believe that the self-service sale of these items is dangerous to
public health. Finally, the court said that even conceding that this specific
indication of actual harm was not valid, the public policy of the state being that
the uncontrolled sale of drugs and medicinei is inimical to public health, a prima
facie case had been made out. Since the defendants had offered no evidence, the
trial court had erred in determining that there had been no showing of danger to
the public health.
The opinion of the majority, basing the issue of danger to public health on
self-service alone as it does, would seem to place the holding on weak grounds.
The dissentirig opinion attacked this reasoning very effectively when it pointed
13. Regulations 15, 18, and 19 of the State Board of Pharmacy are discussed at length by the majority in the instant case.

RECENT DECISIONS
out that these same items could be purchased in a drug store by the same methods
and that even in drugstores that do not employ the self-service method, the person
that dispenses the merchandise is often an inexperienced clerk. This conflict is
due to defective pharmacy laws that do not clearly define what may or may not
14
be sold outside a drug store.
In the present case, the majority failed to consider the effect on the purchaser
when he buys patent medicines in a supermarket. The mere presence of the
pharmacist in the drugstore promotes the confidence bf the purchaser in the
products which he selects. The public knows of the pharmacist's training and
experience and may feel assured that the product he is buying is reliable. Furthermore, the purchaser may question and procure advice from a pharmacist which he
cannot get from a super-market cashier. Had the court considered these factors
and avoided the issue of self-service per se, it would have been able to reach the
same result while effectively drawing a material distinction between super-market
and drugstore sales.
Gary Sunshine
Forum Non Conveniens Applied to Suit Under FELA
"Generally speaking, forum non conveniens deals with the discretionary
power of the court to decline to exercise a possessed jurisdiction whenever, because
of varying factors, it appears that the controversy may be more suitably or
conveniently tried elsewhere." Having thus defined forum non conveniens, the
Supreme Court of the State of Illinois in Cotton v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.1
settled that State's judicial position by accepting the doctrine, and went on to
review its application to suits maintained under the Federal Employer's Liability
Act. The plaintiff, a Kentucky resident who had been injured in the defendant's
14. In New York, there is a bill presently before the legislature (N.Y.
State Pharmacist, Jan., 1959, p. 11; Drug Topics, Feb. 2, 1959, P. 3), which
would clarify this area, making it a misdemeanor for a manufacturer, wholesaler, or jobber to sell medicine to non-drug outlets. It also would prohibit
self-service display of these items by restricting the sale to pharmacists and
imposing on them the duty of acquainting the customer with the potentially
toxic or habit-forming properties of the drug. The benefits of this bill seem obvious and it prompted the New York Times to write in an editorial on Monday.
January 26, 1959:
In a time when some drug stores have been turned
into glorified five-and-tens, when patent medicines are
peddled on TV and dispensed in the supermarkets it is a
good thing to work toward the restoration of safety and
sanity in the sale and purchase of remedies. This bill is
designed, primarily, to protect the public. It hopes to cut
down "blind" buying. But in so doing it can also protect
the pharmacist and give him a new dignity and responsibility.
1.

14 Ill.2d 144, 152 N.E.2d 385 (1958).

